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CASE NOTES
Dealing with Divergences in Fundamental Rights Standards
Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 
26 February 2013, not yet reported
Maartje de Visser*
§1. INTRODUCTION
On 26 February 2013, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) handed down its decision in the case of Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal.1 Th is 
judgment has been much anticipated by both European and national legal scholars, given 
that the Court was for the fi rst time provided with the opportunity of authoritatively 
establishing the meaning of Article  53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. More 
particularly, it was faced with the question whether Member States are allowed, under 
that provision, to apply higher domestic standards of fundamental rights protection 
when a situation falls within the scope of Union law. Even more interesting is that the 
EU legal instrument that prompted the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional to engage 
the CJEU in the former’s fi rst ever preliminary reference was the maligned European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision (as amended). Th e EAW had already led to 
constitutional litigation in a variety of Member States, and a less than satisfactory ruling 
from Luxembourg in the wake of its adoption in 2002.2
Aft er a summary of the relevant facts and the Court’s ruling in Melloni, this note 
off ers observations on three issues. First, it briefl y explores how the decision bolsters the 
eff ect of framework decisions within domestic legal orders. Secondly, it considers the 
Court’s approach to Article 53 of the Charter. Th e Grand Chamber attributes overriding 
importance to respect for the doctrine of primacy in interpreting this provision and 
was accordingly not willing to condone the application of divergent higher national 
standards in the case at hand. While not unexpected, it is to be hoped that the Court will 
show some more fl exibility in future case law and give Member States some latitude to 
* Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
1 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, Judgment of 26 February 2012, not yet reported.
2 For an examination see D. Sarmiento, ‘European Union: Th e European Arrest Warrant and the Quest 
for Constitutional Coherence’, 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2008), p. 171–183.
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apply their higher rights standards in certain situations, a possibility that was explicitly 
mentioned by Advocate General Bot in his Opinion in Melloni.
On a related note, the Court’s engagement with the Charter, both as regards 
determining the scope of the procedural rights at issue, as well as the intensity of the 
review of the contested provision of EU law, was rather superfi cial. It is submitted that 
the Court should improve its approach to safeguard the legitimacy of its fundamental 
rights rulings. Lastly, and adopting a more institutional perspective, I look at the use of 
the preliminary reference procedure by national constitutional courts: in what can be 
considered a welcome development the latter would appear to become more enamoured 
of engaging in a direct dialogue with the CJEU.
§2. RELEVANT FACTS
Stefano Melloni cannot be considered as an upstanding citizen. He was arrested in 
Spain in 1996 to be extradited to Italy to stand trial there for fraudulent bankruptcy. 
Having successfully made bail, Mr Melloni fl ed, whereupon the Italian court decided to 
direct the relevant notices to the lawyers appointed by him at an earlier stage. In 2003, 
the Italian court handed down an in absentia ruling, sentencing Mr Melloni to 10 years’ 
imprisonment. Th e appeal that his lawyers instituted against this verdict was dismissed. 
Th e Italian prosecutor thereupon issued a European Arrest Warrant for execution of the 
sentence. Aft er Mr Melloni was again apprehended by the Spanish police, the competent 
court (Audiencia Nacional) decided in 2008 that he should indeed be surrendered to the 
Italian authorities. Mr Melloni fi led a recurso de amparo against that decision with the 
Spanish Tribunal Constitucional, asserting a violation of the requirements fl owing from 
that court’s interpretation of the constitutional right to a fair trial.3 Th is case law requires 
that the surrender of persons convicted in absentia of serious off ences is conditional 
on them being able to have their conviction reviewed, as part of ‘the essence of a fair 
trial in a way that aff ects human dignity’. Framework Decision 2009/299 concerning 
the European Arrest Warrant,4 which has amended the original Framework Decision 
2002/584,5 however, provides in Article 4a(1) that the execution of an EAW for serving a 
sentence imposed in absentia cannot be refused when the person concerned was aware 
of the forthcoming criminal proceedings or was duly represented by counsel during the 
trial. As this appeared to be the case with Mr Melloni’s situation, the Spanish Tribunal 
Constitucional was confronted with the question whether it could nevertheless retain its 
3 Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution.
4 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26  February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing 
the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, [2009] OJ L81/24.
5 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, [2002] OJ L190/1.
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constitutional case law concerning the right to a fair trial within the scope of EU law. In 
2011, it decided to engage the Court of Justice on this matter by referring three preliminary 
questions that in eff ect outlined three diff erent ways to arrive at such an outcome.6
§3. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
Before being able to consider the three preliminary questions on their merits, the Court 
had to decide on the argument put forward by several governments and the Council 
that the reference was inadmissible, given that the decision of the Audiencia Nacional to 
surrender Mr Melloni to the Italian authorities was taken before the expiry of the time-
limit for transposition of the amendment of the EAW Framework Decision. Following 
Advocate General Bot, the Court however reasoned that it is standing case law that 
procedural rules – like those laid down in Article 4a – apply to all proceedings pending 
at the time when they enter into force. As Mr Melloni’s proceedings were ongoing, the 
request for a preliminary ruling was held admissible ratione temporis.
Turning to the questions referred by the Tribunal Constitucional, the Court of Justice 
was fi rst invited to consider whether Article  4a of the Framework Decision could be 
read as allowing national judicial authorities to make the execution of arrest warrants 
in situations like that of Mr Melloni conditional on the availability of a retrial. Referring 
to both the wording and purpose of this provision, the Court answered in the negative. 
Under the 2002 EAW Framework Decision, it was not always clear when national 
authorities could exercise discretion and refuse or impose conditions on the surrender 
of suspects or convicted persons to other Member States. With the 2009 amendment, the 
Council intended to remedy this situation by exhaustively listing the circumstances in 
which execution of an EAW in relation to an in absentia judgment could not be refused, 
thereby removing legal uncertainty and enhancing the eff ectiveness of the principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions.7 Th is answer meant that the Court of Justice 
also had to confront the second preliminary question, which queried the compatibility of 
Article 4a with the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence guaranteed by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Articles 47 and 48). Th e Grand Chamber needed only fi ve short 
paragraphs to conclude that these rights had not been breached. It noted that the right 
of defendants to be present at their trial is not absolute and that this is recognized by 
Article 4a, which sets out the situations in which they can be taken to have voluntarily 
and unambiguously waived the right to take part in the criminal proceedings. Th is 
interpretation of the fundamental rights at issue was furthermore found to be in line 
with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
6 On this reference, see A. Torres Pérez, ‘Spanish Constitutional Court, Constitutional Dialogue on 
the European Arrest Warrant: Th e Spanish Constitutional Court Knocking on Luxembourg’s Door’, 
8 European Constitutional Law Review 1 (2012), p.105–127.
7 See in particular Framework Decision 2009/299, recitals 2 to 5.
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Th e upshot was that the Court had to address the third and fi nal question, which had 
caused a fl utter of excitement among European constitutional scholars as it concerned 
the meaning and impact (if any) of Article 53 of the Charter. Th is provision states, in 
its relevant part, that ‘[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
adversely aff ecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their 
respective fi elds of application, by Union law … and by Member States’ constitutions’. 
Th e Court held that Article 53 should be read in line with the principle of the primacy 
of EU law. Member States cannot invoke higher constitutionally guaranteed levels of 
fundamental rights protection to restrict or circumscribe the application of Union 
rules fully in compliance with the Charter on their territory. While national authorities 
and courts continue to be able to apply national fundamental rights standards when 
implementing EU law, this cannot undermine the Court’s interpretation of the level 
of protection available under the Charter and the ‘primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of 
EU law’.8 Th e Luxembourg judges furthermore pointed out that the EAW Framework 
Decision was based on a consensus by all the Member States as to the protection that 
should be given to the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence of persons convicted 
in absentia: to allow the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional to insist on compliance with 
more stringent constitutional standards would cast ‘doubt on the uniformity of [this 
European] standard’, ‘undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition’ and 
ultimately ‘compromise the effi  cacy’ of the Framework Decision.9
§4. COMMENTS
A. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF FRAMEWORK DECISIONS
As is well known to students of EU law, framework decisions were among the range of 
instruments that the Council could adopt under the pre-Lisbon third pillar on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Th ey are oft en likened to directives on account 
of the need for Member States to implement framework decisions in national legislation. 
At the same time, a distinctive feature of the former is that they are expressly precluded 
from having direct eff ect.10 Th e Court has however been unwilling to countenance too 
general an incursion on established doctrines of EU law. It held in Pupino11 that the 
principle of conformity in interpretation is fully applicable to framework decisions and 
subsequently reminded national courts in Da Silva that, in line with the normal case law 
8 Case C-399/11 Melloni, para. 60.
9 Ibid., para. 64.
10 Article 34 TEU. Th is was confi rmed by the CJEU in Case C-42/11 Proceedings concerning the execution 
of a European arrest warrant issued against João Pedro Lopes da Silva Jorge, Judgment of 5 September 
2012, not yet reported, para. 53.
11 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
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on the principle of indirect eff ect, they must take ‘the whole body of domestic law into 
consideration’ and apply ‘the interpretative methods recognised by it’.12 In Melloni, the 
Court seems willing to apply another foundational EU principle, namely that of supremacy, 
to framework decisions. Its reasoning in relation to the correct interpretation of Article 53 
of the Charter (see in more detail below) is premised mainly on the need to safeguard the 
primacy of EU law – a quality that by implication must be enjoyed by the measure whose 
eff ectiveness the Court is so keen to preserve: the EAW framework decision. Th e Court’s 
vice-president had in fact argued in favour of the applicability of the supremacy doctrine 
in his extrajudicial writings, several years prior.13 Despite judicial recognition of the fact 
that framework decisions may not entail direct eff ect,14 the Court has strengthened their 
legal eff ect within national legal orders. Its apparent willingness to apply the principle of 
supremacy to these instruments undoubtedly enhances the attractiveness of invoking the 
existing plethora of framework decisions before domestic courts in order to claim the 
rights granted thereunder in the face of persistent implementation defi cits.
B. ARTICLE 53 OF THE CHARTER AND DIFFERENCES IN LEVELS OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
Th e general clauses of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 51 to 54) had already 
spawned a respectable body of literature before the Court of Justice was invited to state 
its understanding of these provisions.15 Focusing on Article 53, the clause at the heart of 
the last preliminary question in Melloni, it has been questioned whether this provision 
poses a threat to the doctrine of the primacy of Union law.16 In fact, the fi rst of the three 
interpretations of Article 53 put forward by the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional in its 
order for reference did precisely that: it contemplates that there may be limits to the 
absolute supremacy of Union law in the name of the better protection of human rights. 
Under this fi rst reading, Article 53 of the Charter is the functional equivalent of Article 53 
of the ECHR: national courts are free to enforce higher constitutional standards of human 
rights protection in situations that fall within the scope of EU law, so as long as they do 
12 Case C-42/11 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against João 
Pedro Lopes da Silva Jorge, para. 56.
13 K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: Th e Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’, 
31 European Law Review 3 (2006), p. 287–315, at p. 289–291.
14 Case C-42/11 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against João 
Pedro Lopes da Silva Jorge, para. 53.
15 See e.g. R.A. Garciá, ‘Th e General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’, 8  European Law Journal 4 (2002), p.  492–514; K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 8 European Constitutional Law Review 3 (2012), p. 375–403; A. Rosas, 
‘When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?’, 19 Jurisprudencija 4 
(2012), p. 1269–1288.
16 For an overview, see J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Th reaten the Supremacy 
of Community Law?’, 38 CMLR 5 (2003), p. 1171–1199.
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not fall below the Charter standard. In contrast, according to the second interpretation 
proff ered in the reference order, national courts are only able to apply the (higher) level of 
protection deriving from domestic constitutional law in cases that lie outside the scope 
of Union law, while the Charter is exclusively applicable in situations where Union law 
applies. According to the third suggested reading of Article 53, the Charter as construed 
by the Court would operate either as a fl oor of protection or as a ceiling depending on the 
specifi c circumstances of the case at hand.
Although the Court encourages national courts to state their views on the questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling,17 its ruling in Melloni engages only with the fi rst 
interpretation suggested by the Tribunal Constitucional and fi rmly rejects this reading 
as being contrary to the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law. Th e message to 
national authorities and courts is twofold. Th e Court confi rms – but this was never 
seriously in doubt – that they are able to concurrently apply the Charter and their own 
constitutional fundamental rights standards in cases that fall within the scope of Union 
law.18 However, the use of domestic standards cannot undermine or detract from (i) core 
tenets of Union law, notably supremacy and eff et utile or (ii) the level of fundamental 
rights protection guaranteed by the Charter as established in CJEU case law. Whether 
this is the case will ultimately be determined in Luxembourg. In other words, national 
courts and authorities will, in most cases falling within the scope of Union law, have to 
refrain from applying domestic standards that off er more protection for fundamental 
rights. Th is is also true in the present case: the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional cannot, 
as a matter of EU law, apply its more stringent case law for safeguarding the right to a fair 
trial guaranteed under the Spanish Constitution and make the surrender of Mr Melloni 
(or other individuals who fi nd themselves in a similar position) conditional on him being 
able to challenge his conviction in Italy.
Th e Court’s approach to Article 53 of the Charter does not come as a surprise and fi ts in 
with judgments like Winner Wetten,19 Melki and Abdeli20 and Križan21 that demonstrate 
the overriding importance ascribed to the supremacy doctrine and the eff ectiveness of EU 
law, also when this is at the expense of national rules of a constitutional nature or is liable 
17 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary reference 
proceedings, [2012] OJ C338/1, para. 24.
18 In Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet reported 
– handed down on the same day as the decision in Melloni – the Court for the fi rst time interpreted 
Article 51 of the Charter, more particularly dealing with the question when Member States must act in 
accordance with the Charter. Although Article 51 states that the Charter is addressed to the latter only 
when they are ‘implementing’ EU law, the Court in Åkerberg Fransson reaffi  rmed its pre-Charter case 
law to the eff ect that Member States must respect EU fundamental rights in situations that fall within 
the scope of Union law.
19 Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim [2010] ECR I-8015, para. 
60–61.
20 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667, para. 52–57.
21 Case C-416/10 Jozef Križan and Others v. Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia, Judgment of 
15 January 2013, not yet reported, para. 70.
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to negatively aff ect the position of constitutional courts within the domestic order. In view 
of the Union’s eff orts to establish a fully operational Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
premised on mutual recognition and mutual trust among Member State authorities, the 
Court’s reluctance to allow national courts to circumscribe the full eff ect of the EAW 
Framework Decision is also readily understandable. Furthermore, the applicant’s appeal 
to the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional was quite clearly a last-ditch attempt to evade 
justice, there seemingly being no genuine concern with upholding national fundamental 
rights as a matter of principle. Th e fact that the applicant in this case was not particularly 
‘likeable’ may also have been on the judges’ mind in reaching their decision.
It is submitted that the decision in Melloni does not, and should not, foreclose all 
possibility for Member States to apply higher fundamental rights standards when Union 
law and the Charter are applicable. In his Opinion, Advocate General Bot draws a useful 
distinction between situations in which the Union legislature has decided on a common 
defi nition of the degree of protection to be aff orded to a particular right and situations 
in which such has not occurred.22 In the latter scenario, he accepts that Member States 
have greater leeway to apply their own rights standards, ‘provided that the national level 
of protection may be reconciled with the proper implementation of EU law and does not 
infringe other fundamental rights protected under EU law’. Bot does not discuss this 
possibility in any great detail, undoubtedly because the case at hand did not fall within 
this category, but it would appear to cover situations where Member States have some 
latitude in deciding how to implement Union law. Although the Court does not explicitly 
endorse this bifurcated approach, it does not reject it either. Precisely because it places so 
much emphasis on the fact that the pertinent provision of the EAW Framework Decision 
refl ects a harmonized and jointly chosen level of protection, the Court leaves open 
the possibility of adopting a more lenient approach in future cases where the Member 
States have not enshrined their shared understanding of a particular human right in 
the EU legal instrument to be applied. In this context, reference should also be made to 
Article 4(2) TEU, which requires the Union to respect the identities of its Member States 
‘inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’.23 Th e Court has 
already cited this provision in its case law when assessing whether Member States could 
justifi ably derogate from the Treaty’s free movement provisions.24 Th e Spanish Tribunal 
Constitucional had not relied on this provision in its reference order and the judgment 
22 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-399/11 Melloni, para. 124 to 128.
23 On this provision, see e.g. A. Saiz Arnaiz and C. Alcoberro Liivina (eds.), National Constitutional Identity 
and European Integration (Intersentia, Antwerp 2013); L. Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional 
Identity before and aft er Lisbon’, 6 Utrecht Law Review 3 (2010), p. 36–49; A. von Bogdandy and S. 
Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’, 48 
CMLR 5 (2011), p. 1417–1453.
24 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR I-13693; Case 
C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn en Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės 
administracija e.a. [2011] ECR I-3787. See also the pre-Lisbon ruling in Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- 
und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
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also makes no mention of Article 4(2) TEU, probably because this was unnecessary to 
decide the matter at hand. Th e question whether the Spanish constitutional case law on 
the right to a fair trial could be considered as part of that country’s national identity 
was however raised during the hearing, and was rebutted by the Spanish agent before 
the Court. Advocate General Bot also took account of Article 4(2) TEU in his Opinion. 
While he did not consider that Spain’s constitutional identity was at stake in the present 
case, he did acknowledge that, in principle, Member States can challenge the validity of 
secondary Union law on this basis.25
It is indeed readily imaginable that situations may arise where a Member State (or its 
principal constitutional guardian) considers that the scope or existence of a particular 
national constitutional right is part of its constitutional identity, and should be protected 
from encroachment by Union law. Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht, for instance, has 
declared that Germany’s constitutional identity encompasses a right to informational 
privacy, meaning that ‘citizens’ enjoyment of freedom may not be totally recorded and 
registered’.26 Article 4(2) TEU provides the Court with a tool that it can – and should 
– use to allow Member States to rely on their domestic standards of rights protection 
also in situations where the Charter applies. Against this backdrop, it is submitted that 
it would have been better had the Court placed less emphasis on the idea of the uniform 
application of Union law in Melloni. Generally speaking, in today’s Union such unity is 
more fi ctional than real: there is a (growing) number of legal instruments and techniques 
that are specifi cally designed or at least countenance space for national diversity and 
variety in many policy areas.27
A related issue that warrants attention is the Court’s engagement with the Charter 
in Melloni. Two aspects in particular warrant attention: the way the Court has decided 
on the proper scope of the provisions guaranteeing the procedural rights in issue and its 
reasoning in holding that Article 4a of the EAW Framework Decision was compatible 
with these rights.
As regards the fi rst issue, the more the scope recognized for the rights guaranteed by 
the Charter is in keeping with national constitutional doctrines, the less signifi cant or 
potentially problematic the question of the concurrent application of two fundamental 
rights standards becomes for national authorities and courts (and vice versa). Th is 
would militate in favour of the Court publicly engaging in a comparative analysis of 
national constitutional traditions in establishing the meaning and scope of Charter 
25 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-399/11 Melloni, para. 138–145. He also rightly pointed 
out that a country’s national identity is not ipso facto at stake simply because a case involves questions 
regarding the protection of national fundamental rights.
26 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08 (2010).
27 Th ink of the technique of minimum harmonization, the proliferation of opt-outs or the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation among a group of Member States. See e.g. G. de Búrca, ‘Diff erentiation within 
the “Core”? Th e Case of the Internal Market’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott, Constitutional Change in the 
EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000); B. De Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos 
(eds.), Th e Many Faces of Diff erentiation in EU Law (Intersentia, Antwerp 2001).
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rights similar or akin to those protected as a matter of domestic law. Unfortunately, no 
such comparison is featured in the decision in Melloni.28 Although this is in line with 
the general dearth of comparative work in the Court’s case law, it may detract from the 
acceptability of the Court’s interpretation of the meaning and scope of Charter rights, 
notably in situations where domestic constitutional law recognizes a higher standard 
of protection. In his Opinion, the Advocate General did refer to ‘the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States’,29 but his reasoning in this respect is not 
unproblematic. Bot argued that the Court could not rely on such common traditions in 
the case at hand to apply a higher level of protection than that available under the ECHR: 
the fact that Framework Decision 2009/299 was adopted by all the Member States ‘allows 
us to presume, with suffi  cient certainty, that a large majority of the Member States does 
not share the view taken by the Tribunal Constitucional in its case law’.30 Th is may or 
may not in fact be the case. For our purposes, the signifi cance of this approach resides in 
the heavy responsibility that it places on national ministers and civil servants to ensure 
respect for their constitutional traditions when negotiating in Council on the meaning 
and scope of fundamental rights to be recognized in Union legal acts. Th e problem is that 
government representatives may not always have an incentive to explain and defend the 
case law of their national constitutional courts – the institutions principally in charge of 
expounding such traditions in most Member States – at European level. Th is seems to 
have been the case with the discussions on the 2009 EAW Framework Decision, and we 
can here also point to the stance adopted by the Spanish government representative in 
Melloni and that of the Czech counterpart in the earlier Landtová case,31 who basically 
denounced their constitutional courts’ case law in Luxembourg.
Th e CJEU did explicitly refer to the ECHR and Strasbourg case law in Melloni, holding 
that its interpretation of the scope of the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence under 
the Charter is in line with that provided for under the Convention.32 It is noteworthy 
that the Court did not consider whether Union law should provide more extensive 
protection for these procedural rights, given that the Charter explicitly acknowledges 
this possibility.33 In my view, we should be able to expect more from the Court: regardless 
28 Th e Court did refer to its earlier judgment in Case C-619/10 Trade Agency v. Seramico Investments Ltd, 
Judgment of 6 September 2012, not yet reported. In that case it found (at para. 52) that the right to a fair 
trial ‘results from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’ and was reaffi  rmed in 
Article 47(2) of the Charter, without however discussing the precise scope of this right in the various 
Member States.
29 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-399/11 Melloni, para. 84.
30 Bot also mentioned that the hearing before the Court revealed ‘no predominant trend’ in the domestic 
legal orders: however, only nine of the then 27 Member States intervened before the Court.
31 Case C-399/09 Marie Landtová v. Česká správa socialního zabezpečení [2011] ECR I-5573.
32 ECtHR, Medenica v. Switzerland, Judgment of 14 June 2001, ECHR 2001-VI; ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy, 
Judgment of 1 March 2006, ECHR 2006-II; ECtHR, Haralampiev v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 24 April 
2012.
33 Article 52(3) Charter. See also the discussion about the application of the so-called ‘mirror principle’ 
by English and Dutch courts, on which e.g. R. Masterman, ‘Deconstructing the Mirror Principle’, 
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of whether it opts for an interpretation of fundamental rights that is fully aligned with 
the Convention and Strasbourg case law or whether it makes use of the possibility to off er 
more protection, its interlocutors should be able to see that the choice on the meaning 
and scope of the relevant fundamental right has been established in an informed and 
thoughtful manner.34 Th is is all the more so given that the ECHR is intended to operate 
as a fl oor for the protection of rights: recall that aft er Melloni, Member States in many 
cases will not be able to invoke higher domestic standards, so that when the Court is 
content that it is in line with Strasbourg and nothing more, the fl oor established under 
the Convention in eff ect becomes the ceiling in situations that fall within the scope of EU 
law, thereby depriving Member States from the freedom granted to them by Article 53 of 
the Convention to apply a higher standard of human rights protection.
Th e second issue concerns the intensity of review. Th e Court in Melloni did not wish 
to be seen to second-guess policy determinations for which there exists broad support 
among the Member States, as can be seen in the superfi cial and scant reasoning on the 
question of Article 4a’s validity as well as in its characterization of that relevant provision 
as refl ecting ‘the consensus reached by all Member States’ regarding the scope to be given 
under EU law to the procedural rights of persons convicted in absentia. Th e deferential 
attitude adopted in this case fi ts in a long tradition in which the Court is quite strict when 
examining whether national measures comport with Union law, but is considerably less 
assertive when adjudicating challenges to EU legislative measures, including for alleged 
fundamental rights violations. Th e Court has been lambasted for being too lenient35 and 
in the wake of the Charter acquiring binding force, several commentators expressed the 
hope that the Court would adopt a more critical approach in determining the validity of 
European legal measures, notably legislative acts.36
It did so in two fairly recent cases, actually striking down legislative provisions 
for infringing the right to the protection of personal data and the equality principle 
respectively.37 It is disappointing that the Court appears to revert to its traditional 
in R. Masterman and I. Leigh, Th e United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional and 
Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013); J.H. Gerards, ‘Samenloop van 
nationale en Europese grondrechtenbepalingen – hoe moet de rechter daarmee omgaan?’, Tijdschrift  
voor Constitutioneel Recht 3 (2010), p. 224–255.
34 Th e Court could have usefully followed Advocate General Bot in this regard, who explicitly addressed 
the issue of higher protection, even though he concluded that this was not required in the case at hand.
35 See e.g. J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘Th e European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, 29 CMLR 
4 (1992), p. 669–692; U. Everling, ‘Will Europe Slip on Bananas? Th e Bananas Judgment of the Court of 
Justice and National Courts’, 33 CMLR 3 (1996), p. 401–437.
36 See e.g. S. Iglesias-Sanchez, ‘Th e Court and the Charter: Th e Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’, 49 CMLR 5 (2012), p. 1565–1611, particularly at 
p. 1580 et seq.; A. Albi, ‘From the Banana Saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond: Could the Post-Communist 
Constitutional Courts Teach the EU a Lesson in the Rule of Law?’, 47 CMLR 3 (2010), p. 791–829.
37 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen 
[2010] ECR I-1063; Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others 
v. Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-773.
Case Notes
586 20 MJ 4 (2013)
light touch approach in the present case. In my view, there are good reasons for the 
Luxembourg judges to exercise their powers of review in a more robust manner, 
notably when it comes to assessing whether the Union legislature has duly protected 
or respected fundamental rights. From a legitimacy perspective and the acceptability 
of EU law in the domestic legal orders, it is proper for the Union legislature to be 
seen to be actually kept in check by the judiciary, akin to the way in which national 
constitutional courts hold national parliaments to account,38 particularly given that 
the Court perceives itself as a constitutional court.39 A higher intensity of review 
is furthermore appropriate as the EU is becoming more actively involved in areas 
with a clear (classical) fundamental rights dimension, such as immigration, asylum 
and criminal law. As a counter-majoritarian institution, the Court has a particular 
responsibility to see to it that the rights of vulnerable groups in societies do not lose 
out in situations where political institutions are mainly guided by the general interest 
or political objectives.
C. THE USE OF THE PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE BY 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
National constitutional courts have, generally speaking and subject to a few exceptions, 
been reluctant to request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice. Th eir reticence 
has been attributed to a ‘fear of losing freedom, sovereignty and independence’.40 In 
the years following the adoption of the EAW Framework Decision in 2002, national 
implementing measures were challenged in several countries as incompatible with the 
constitutional prohibition on the extradition of citizens and respect for fundamental 
rights. Th e Polish and German constitutional courts and the Cypriot Supreme Court 
found that the contested statutes indeed violated constitutional principles,41 while the 
Czech constitutional court held that it was possible to engage in conforming interpretation 
to save the national legislation from annulment.42 Th ese rulings indirectly cast doubt 
on the validity of the underlying Framework Decision and raised questions about the 
38 See e.g. W. Sadurski, Rights before Courts – A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist 
States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer, Dordrecht 2005); D.P. Kommers and R.A. Miller, Th e 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (3rd edition, Duke University Press, 
Durham 2012).
39 See e.g. B. Vesterdorf, ‘A Constitutional Court for the EU?’, 4 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 4 (2006), p.  607–617; O. Due, ‘A Constitutional Court for the European Communities’ and F. 
Jacobs, ‘Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?’, in D. Curtin and 
D. O’Keeff e, Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law (Butterworths 
Law, Dublin 1992).
40 M. Cartabia, ‘Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously’, 5 European Constitutional Law Review 1 
(2009), p. 5–31, at p. 25.
41 Decision P 1/05, Europejsski Nakaz Aresztowania, OTK ZU No 4/A/2005, poz. 42; BVerfG 113, 273 
(2005) and Decision of 7 November 2005, A. No. 294/2005 respectively.
42 Judgment Pl. ÚS 66/04 of 3 May 2006.
Case Notes
20 MJ 4 (2013) 587
relationship between EU third-pillar instruments and national constitutions. None of 
the courts however availed themselves of the possibility to seek the Court’s guidance on 
either of these matters. In the end, the latter was able to hand down a preliminary ruling 
upholding the EAW Framework Decision aft er the traditionally Euro-friendly Belgian 
Cour constitutionnelle decided to refer questions to that eff ect to the Kirchberg.43
Th ere are signs that we are now witnessing a change in approach to the use of 
Article 267 TFEU. Th e Spanish Tribunal Constitucional had for a long time opined that 
it was the responsibility of ordinary Spanish judges to submit questions of EU law to 
Luxembourg.44 Melloni is noteworthy for marking a break with that line of reasoning 
– thereby mirroring the evolution evident in the case law of its Italian counterpart 
which since 2008 demonstrates a similar willingness to engage in a direct dialogue with 
Luxembourg.45 Th en, about a month aft er the Court’s ruling in Melloni, the French 
Conseil constitutionnel made its fi rst ever request for a preliminary ruling, which, 
interestingly, also concerned the EAW Framework Decision and the interpretation 
of several provisions contained therein in light of the principle of eff ective judicial 
protection.46
What can explain the growing readiness of constitutional courts to avail 
themselves of the preliminary reference procedure? It has been noted that a shared 
concern for those courts when called upon to address EAW issues was ‘whether 
fundamental rights are properly protected by the EAW and what scope of action (…) 
member states have under the third pillar when protecting fundamental rights in EAW 
cases’.47 To be sure, when the Framework Decision was adopted in 2002, fundamental 
rights were available as grounds for review of EU legal instruments in the guise of 
general principles of EU law. Th e fact of an unwritten bill of rights and the manner 
of judicial enforcement may however have led constitutional courts to wonder about 
the comparative eff ectiveness of the Court of Justice as a human rights guardian. We 
should further not forget that at the time, the latter could only exercise its preliminary 
reference jurisdiction when a Member State had made a declaration to that eff ect.48 
Matters are very diff erent today. On the one hand, pre-existing limitations on the 
Court’s competences in the former third pillar realm have been removed, thereby 
broadening the possibilities for judicial review. On the other hand, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights confi rms the Court’s fundamental rights mandate and provides 
43 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VWZ v. Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633.
44 See in particular sentencia 28/1991 of 14 February 1991 and sentencia 372/1993 of 13 December 1993.
45 In ordinanza 103/2008 of 13 February 2008 the Italian constitutional court decided that it is competent 
to refer preliminary questions in direct actions, in contrast to its earlier case law in which it denied such 
a competence, notably in ordinanza 536/1995 of 15 December 1995.
46 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. v. Premier ministre, Judgment of 30 May 2013, not yet reported.
47 D. Sarmiento, 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2008), p. 177.
48 Article 35 TEU.
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more ammunition when it comes to questioning the legality or the correct reading of 
provisions of EU law.
Furthermore, under the Court’s reading of Article  53 of the Charter in Melloni, 
constitutional courts have a clear incentive to enter into a dialogue with Luxembourg 
about the degree of protection aff orded under the Charter, with a view to trying to 
minimize discrepancies with the level of protection granted to similar rights under 
national constitutional law, and about the possibility of enforcing higher national 
standards in particular circumstances. It is thus to be hoped that constitutional courts 
will continue to heed Advocate General Ruiz Colomer’s call in Advocaten voor de Wereld 
to ‘enter into a dialogue with the Court of Justice’ and thereby permit the ‘foundations to 
be laid for a general discussion’ on the protection of fundamental rights in a multilevel 
legal order.49 At the same time, also in light of the Court’s insistence in Melloni on the 
doctrines of supremacy and uniformity, it is reasonable to expect instances where the 
European and national courts will have (radically) diff erent views about the level of 
protection to be awarded to a certain fundamental right. In such cases, the tone and 
success of judicial dialogues are liable to be (seriously) aff ected and it cannot be excluded 
that the diff erent courts engage in futile attempts to convince each other, thus sharpening 
the contrast between their positions.
In any event, where engagements between the CJEU and national constitutional 
courts have in the past focused on the need for, and the former’s capacity to off er 
protection of fundamental rights, the ruling in Melloni may herald judicial debates on 
the precise meaning and scope of particular fundamental rights. In doing so, the Court 
would do well to engage more with and make explicit reference to national constitutional 
law in its decisions to avoid the impression that fundamental rights at Union level are 
construed ‘in complete abstraction from the Member States’ constitutional traditions 
and laws’.50
49 Opinion of AG Ruiz Colomer in Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 
para. 28, 81–82.
50 C. Ladenburger, ‘European Union Institutional Report’, in Th e Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-
Lisbon: Th e Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions (Tartu University Press, Tallinn 2012), p. 179.
